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PERCEPTION OVER REALITY: EXTENDING  
THE ADA’S CONCEPT OF “REGARDED AS” 
PROTECTION UNDER FEDERAL  
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 
CRAIG ROBERT SENN*
ABSTRACT
 A head-scratching inconsistency currently exists in federal em-
ployment discrimination law. On the one hand, an employer is 100% 
liable under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) if it 
erroneously “regards” a person as having an actual “disability” and 
then discriminates based on this misperception. 
 On the other hand, many courts have held that this “regarded as” 
protection does not extend to other federal employment discrimination 
laws, such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) and 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA). In these 
jurisdictions, an employer is not liable at all under Title VII or the 
ADEA if it erroneously “regards” a person as (1) being of a certain 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin or (2) being at least forty 
years old and then discriminates based on this misperception. Accord-
ing to these courts, this disparity in employee protection (and employ-
er liability) is warranted because the ADA includes an express “re-
garded as” protection, while Title VII and the ADEA do not. 
 This Article proposes a wholesale judicial (and, if necessary, legis-
lative) extension of the “regarded as” protection under federal em-
ployment discrimination law. This uniformity of employee protection 
(and employer liability) under the ADA, Title VII, and the ADEA is 
warranted for two reasons: (1) these other federal employment dis-
crimination laws have long-shared with the ADA an identical con-
gressional and judicial philosophy—namely, that employer perception 
or stereotype is an appropriate justification for imposing employment 
discrimination liability, even when that perception or stereotype is er-
roneous and inaccurate; and (2) the “regarded as” protection is neces-
sary to capture an otherwise elusive subset of discriminating employ-
ers—the “erroneous discriminators”—and thus fully advance the 
comprehensive antidiscrimination purposes of these other laws. 
 Simply put, an employer that acts based on perception or stereo-
type regarding a person possessing a certain protected trait under 
Title VII or the ADEA is no less a “discriminator” just because its per-
ception or applied stereotype was “wrong” rather than “right.” The ex-
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tension of the “regarded as” protection across the federal employment 
discrimination spectrum will bring needed uniformity of employee 
protection and treat these “erroneous discriminators” as harshly as 
any other discriminating employer. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION
 Consider the following five employment scenarios, and determine 
whether each person has a viable claim under federal employment 
discrimination law: 
Scenario #1: Anna is interviewing for a job at Company 
XYZ. During the interview, the company supervisor notices 
that Anna has no hair, and he assumes that she has, or is 
recovering from, cancer and will not work as productively as 
one who is completely healthy. Although Anna is the most 
qualified applicant for the position, the supervisor refuses to 
select her solely because he perceives and regards her as 
having a disability. In fact, Anna does not have cancer or 
any other disabling condition. 
Scenario #2: Bob is interviewing for a job at Company XYZ. 
During the interview, the company supervisor notices that 
Bob is completely gray-haired, and he assumes that he is at 
least fifty years old and will not work as productively as a 
thirty-five year old. Although Bob is the most qualified ap-
plicant for the position, the supervisor refuses to select him 
solely because he perceives and regards him as being over 
fifty. In fact, Bob is thirty-five years old. 
Scenario #3: Catherine is interviewing for a job at Company 
XYZ. During the interview, the company supervisor notices 
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that Catherine has a relatively large abdominal area, and he 
assumes that she is pregnant and will not work as produc-
tively as one who is not pregnant. Although Catherine is the 
most qualified applicant for the position, the supervisor re-
fuses to select her solely because he perceives and regards 
her as being pregnant. In fact, Catherine is not pregnant. 
Scenario #4: Don is interviewing for a job at Company XYZ. 
During the interview, the company supervisor notices that 
Don has a Spanish accent, and he assumes that he is from 
Mexico and will not work as productively as a person from 
another country, such as the United States. Although Don is 
the most qualified applicant for the position, the supervisor 
refuses to select him solely because he perceives and regards 
him as being of Mexican lineage and national origin. In fact, 
Don and his family have no such lineage or origin. 
Scenario #5: Ellen is interviewing for a job at Company 
XYZ. During the interview, the company supervisor notices 
that Ellen is wearing a Star of David necklace, and he as-
sumes that she is Jewish and will not work as productively 
as one who is a member of another religion. Although Ellen 
is the most qualified applicant for the position, the supervi-
sor refuses to select her solely because he perceives and re-
gards her as being Jewish. In fact, Ellen is not Jewish.
Which persons have viable federal employment discrimination 
claims? All of them? None of them? Some of them? 
 At present, there is a peculiar inconsistency in federal employ-
ment discrimination law. On the one hand, the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act of 1990 (ADA)1 includes express protection for an indi-
vidual who, while lacking any actual “disability,”2 is erroneously “re-
garded” or perceived by an employer as having such a disability and 
then discriminated against on that basis.3 Because of the ADA’s ex-
press “regarded as” protection, Anna (in Scenario #1 above) has a vi-
                                                                                                                    
 1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2006). The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 
(ADA) prohibits employment-based discrimination against a “qualified individual with a 
disability because of the disability.” Id. § 12112(a)-(b); see also id. §12112(b) (defining “dis-
criminate” as used in subsection (a)); id. § 12111(8) (defining “qualified individual with a 
disability”). The ADA also prohibits retaliatory discrimination against a person for having 
“opposed any act or practice made unlawful” by the ADA or having “made a charge, testi-
fied, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing” 
under the ADA. Id. § 12203(a). 
 2. The ADA defines the term “disability” to include a “physical or mental impair-
ment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual.” 
Id. § 12102(2)(A). 
 3. Id. § 12102(2)(C) (defining the term “disability” to include “being regarded as hav-
ing such an impairment”); see infra Part II.A (discussing the provisions and meaning of the 
ADA’s “regarded as” protection). 
830 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:827 
able federal employment discrimination claim. On the other hand, in 
contrast to the ADA, none of the other primary federal employment 
discrimination laws—such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
(Title VII)4 or the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 
(ADEA)5—contain an explicit “regarded as” protection. The absence 
of this express protection has led many courts to conclude that no le-
gal recourse exists for an individual who is erroneously “regarded” or 
perceived by an employer as falling within (1) a Title VII-protected 
category (i.e., race, color, religion, sex (including pregnancy),6 or na-
tional origin) or (2) the ADEA-protected category (i.e., age of forty 
years old or older) and then discriminated against on that basis.7
 Thus, despite being subjected to discriminatory conduct that is 
comparable to that directed at Anna and incurring wage-related and 
other losses that are comparable to those suffered by Anna, neither 
Bob, Catherine, Don, nor Ellen (in Scenarios #2, #3, #4, or #5 above, 
respectively) necessarily has a viable federal employment discrimina-
tion claim. Regrettably, Company XYZ—acting with an equally  
egregious intent in each of these four scenarios—would escape scot-
free and without consequence under Title VII or the ADEA for  
its discrimination. 
 Part II of this Article begins by discussing the express provisions 
and meaning of the “regarded as” protection under the ADA. Impor-
tantly, it then identifies and explains that protection’s underlying 
congressional philosophy as well as its purpose. As to the former, the 
ADA’s “regarded as” protection reflects the central philosophy that 
employer perception or stereotype is an appropriate justification for 
imposing employment discrimination liability, even when that per-
ception or stereotype is erroneous and inaccurate. As to the latter, 
the “regarded as” protection plays a necessary role in achieving the 
ADA’s goal of a comprehensive prohibition of disability-based em-
ployment discrimination.8
                                                                                                                    
 4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
prohibits employment-based discrimination against any person because of his or her race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin. See id. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Title VII also contains an an-
tiretaliation provision similar to that of the ADA. See id. § 2000e-3(a); supra note 1 (de-
scribing the ADA’s antiretaliation provision). 
 5. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006). The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 
(ADEA) prohibits employment-based discrimination against a person because of his or her 
age (i.e., forty years old or older). See id. §§ 623(a), 631(a) (limiting the ADEA’s applicabili-
ty to persons “at least 40 years of age”). The ADEA also contains an antiretaliation provi-
sion similar to those of the ADA and Title VII. See id. § 623(d); supra notes 1, 4 (describing 
the ADA’s and Title VII’s antiretaliation provisions, respectively). 
 6. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (stating that “because of sex” includes “because of or on 
the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions”). 
 7. See infra Part III.A (discussing judicial decisions which have rejected “regarded 
as” protections and claims under Title VII and/or the ADA). 
 8. See infra Part II.B (discussing the congressional philosophy and purpose behind 
the ADA’s “regarded as” protection). 
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 Part III discusses judicial decisions that have addressed whether 
“regarded as” protection extends beyond the ADA to other federal 
employment discrimination laws. While some courts have recognized 
the viability of non-ADA “regarded as” claims, many have rejected 
these claims because of the absence of an express “regarded as” pro-
tection in these other laws. 
 Part IV then proposes an extension of “regarded as” protection to 
Title VII and the ADEA, and it defends that extension on two prima-
ry grounds. First, the above-referenced congressional philosophy re-
flected in the ADA’s “regarded as” protection is not within the exclu-
sive domain of the ADA. Rather, when enacting the ADEA and the 
Title VII-amending Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA),9
Congress embraced this same philosophy of targeting an employer’s 
erroneous perception over an employee’s reality for purposes of em-
ployment discrimination liability. Similarly, the Supreme Court has 
adopted this philosophy in its ADEA and Title VII decisions.10 This 
common and shared philosophy among these laws warrants common 
and shared protections (i.e., “regarded as” protection) across the fed-
eral employment discrimination law spectrum.  
 Second, this extension of “regarded as” protection is necessary to 
fully advance the comparable policies of each of the federal employ-
ment discrimination laws. With “regarded as” protection under an 
applicable law, that law’s underlying antidiscrimination policy and 
purposes are fully promoted, because all employers that manifest 
discriminatory intent (including the subset of “erroneous discrimina-
tors,” who discriminate based on perceptions or stereotypes that 
happen to be inaccurate) are held liable. But, without “regarded as” 
protection, that same law’s underlying antidiscrimination policy and 
purposes are frustrated because these “erroneous discriminators” are 
allowed to avoid liability. At present, the ADA falls into the former 
scenario, while Title VII and the ADEA regrettably fall into the lat-
ter scenario. 
II.   “REGARDED AS” PROTECTION UNDER THE ADA 
 Given its express “regarded as” protection, the ADA is the rele-
vant starting point for evaluating whether that type of protection is 
                                                                                                                    
 9. Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)). The Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA) amended Title VII to clarify that, for purposes of 
unlawful discrimination, the term “because of sex” includes “because of or on the basis of 
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.” Id.
 10. See, e.g., Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610-13 (1993) (discussing age-
based stereotyping in the context of an ADEA age-discrimination claim); Price Waterhouse 
v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250-52, 255-56 (1989) (plurality opinion) (discussing sex-based 
stereotyping in the context of a Title VII sex-discrimination claim); see also infra Part 
IV.A.1-2 (discussing these decisions). 
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warranted under other federal employment discrimination laws. 
Specifically, it is important to understand (1) the basic provisions 
and meaning of the ADA’s “regarded as” protection, (2) the congres-
sional philosophy reflected by this protection, and (3) the primary 
purpose or rationale for this protection. 
A.   The Express Provisions and Meaning  
of the “Regarded As” Protection 
 Congress explicitly incorporated the ADA’s “regarded as” protec-
tion and concept into various provisions. Most importantly, the ADA 
provides a multipronged definition for the term “disability,” so as to 
encompass disability-based discrimination that occurs because of ac-
tual or perceived “disability”: 
(2) Disability. The term “disability” means, with respect to an indi-
vidual— 
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one 
or more of the major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.11
As long as a person “meets any one of these three tests” or prongs, he 
or she is deemed covered and protected under the ADA.12
 The ADA also incorporates the “regarded as” concept when ad-
dressing whether its employment discrimination protections apply to 
persons engaging in, or believed to be engaged in, illegal drug 
usage.13 Understandably, the ADA excludes from its protection an 
                                                                                                                    
 11. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2006) (emphasis added). In formulating the ADA’s three-
pronged definition of “disability,” Congress drew “almost verbatim from the definition of 
‘handicapped individual’ included in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the definition of 
‘handicap’ contained in the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988.” Bragdon v. Abbott, 
524 U.S. 624, 631 (1998) (citation omitted); see Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 
(FHAA), Pub. L. No. 100-430, § 5(b)(h), 102 Stat. 1619 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 
3602(h) (2006)) (defining “handicap” in a manner virtually identical to the ADA’s definition 
of “disability”); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 7(6), 87 Stat. 355 (defining 
“handicapped individual” as a person having “a physical or mental disability which . . . 
constitutes or results in a substantial handicap to employment”); see also H.R. REP. NO.
101-485(II), at 50 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 332 (Comm. on Education 
and Labor) (stating similarly that the ADA’s “disability” definition “is comparable to the 
definition of the term ‘individual with handicaps’ in . . . the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and . 
. . the Fair Housing [Amendments] Act”); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(III), at 27 (1990), as re-
printed in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 450 (Comm. on the Judiciary) (stating similarly that the 
ADA’s “disability” definition is “the same basic definition” as that “used in the Rehabilita-
tion Act of 1973 and in the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988”). 
 12. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(III), at 27; see also EEOC Regulations to Implement the 
Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) 
app. (2008) (stating similarly that “[a]n individual must satisfy at least one of these [three] 
parts [of the “disability” definition] in order to be considered an individual with a disabili-
ty” under the ADA). 
 13. See 42 U.S.C. § 12114(a)-(b). 
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individual “who is currently engaging in the illegal use of drugs” and 
then subjected to adverse employment action based on that usage.14
But, again using the “regarded as” concept, Congress made this ex-
clusion inapplicable (and thus the ADA’s protections still fully apply) 
to a person who “is erroneously regarded as engaging in such use, 
but is not engaging in such use.”15
 The ADA’s legislative history, in addition to accompanying regula-
tions from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), 
the federal administrative agency that, in part, enforces the ADA, 
explains the basic meaning of this “regarded as” protection. When 
enacting the ADA, Congress acknowledged that the “regarded as” 
prong “applies whether or not a person has an impairment,” as this 
protection was solely “intended to cover persons who are treated . . . 
as having a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits 
a major life activity.”16 Consequently, the “regarded as” protection 
does not require an actual “disability” but also applies to the follow-
ing two groups of individuals:  
(1) the non-disabled but actually impaired group: those who “have 
an impairment which is not substantially limiting [as to a major 
life activity] but [are] perceived by the employer . . . [as having] a 
substantially limiting impairment”;17 and  
(2) the non-disabled and non-impaired group (i.e., the completely 
“healthy” group): those who “have no impairment at all” but are 
“regarded by the employer . . . as having a substantially limiting 
impairment.”18
                                                                                                                    
 14. Id. § 12114(a); see also id. § 12210(a) (describing the same exclusion among the 
ADA’s “Miscellaneous Provisions”). 
 15. Id. § 12114(b)(3); see also id. § 12210(b) (describing the same “regarded as” protec-
tion among the ADA’s “Miscellaneous Provisions”); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 77, 80 
(stating, respectively, that Congress did “not intend to affect [ADA] coverage for individu-
als who . . . are erroneously perceived as having a current drug problem” and that those 
“regarded as illegal drug users are protected against discrimination”). 
 16. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(III), at 29; see also id. at 30 (similarly stating that the “re-
garded as” protection would apply to “a person who is rejected from a job because of the 
myths, fears and stereotypes associated with disabilities . . . , whether or not the person’s 
physical or mental condition would be considered a disability under the first or second part 
of the definition”). 
 17. EEOC Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l) app. (noting also that the “regarded as” 
prong can be met in “different ways”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 53 (stating si-
milarly that the “regarded as” protection extends to those “who ha[ve] [a] physical or men-
tal impairment that does not substantially limit a major life activity” but who are “treated” 
by an employer as having such impairment). 
 18. EEOC Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l) app. (stating similarly that the “regarded 
as” protection is applicable if the employer “erroneously believes the individual has a sub-
stantially limiting impairment that the individual actually does not have”); see also H.R.
REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 53 (stating similarly that the “regarded as” protection extends to 
those who have “no physical or mental impairment” but who are “treated” by an employer 
as having such impairment). 
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 In its ADA-implementing regulations, the EEOC provides in-
sightful illustrations of persons who fall into these two distinct 
groups. This following example describes an employee who would re-
ceive “regarded as” protection as a member of the first group (the 
nondisabled but actually impaired group): 
[S]uppose an employee [in fact] has controlled high blood pressure 
that is not substantially limiting. If an employer reassigns the in-
dividual to less strenuous work because of unsubstantiated fears 
that the individual will suffer a heart attack if he or she continues 
to perform strenuous work, the employer would be regarding the 
individual as disabled.19
Similarly, the EEOC gives this next example of an employee who 
would receive “regarded as” protection, even though he or she is a 
member of the second group (the nondisabled and nonimpaired 
group): 
[Suppose] an employer discharged an employee in response to a 
rumor that the employee is infected with Human Immunodeficien-
cy Virus (HIV). Even though the rumor is totally unfounded and 
the individual has no impairment at all, the individual is consi-
dered an individual with a disability because the employer per-
ceived . . . this individual as being disabled. Thus, in this example, 
the employer, by discharging this employee, is discriminating on 
the basis of disability.20
Consequently, under the ADA’s “regarded as” concept, it is not neces-
sary for an individual to have an actual or real disability in order to 
be protected from employment discrimination. Rather, in order to be 
ADA-protected, it is sufficient that a person be erroneously  
“regarded” or “perceived” by an employer as having that actual or 
real disability.21
                                                                                                                    
 In Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., the Supreme Court similarly described how the 
ADA’s “regarded as” protection primarily applies to these two groups or categories of people: 
There are two apparent ways in which individuals may fall within [the “re-
garded as” prong of] this statutory definition: (1) a covered entity mistakenly 
believes that a person has a physical impairment that substantially limits one 
or more major life activities, or (2) a covered entity mistakenly believes that an 
actual, nonlimiting impairment substantially limits one or more major life ac-
tivities. In both cases, it is necessary that a covered entity entertain mispercep-
tions about the individual—it must believe either that one has a substantially 
limiting impairment that one does not have or that one has a substantially li-
miting impairment when, in fact, the impairment is not so limiting.
527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999) (emphasis added). 
 19. EEOC Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l) app. (emphasis added).  
 20. Id. (emphasis added). 
 21. The “record of” prong of the ADA’s “disability” definition, see supra note 11 and 
accompanying text, has certain parallels to the “regarded as” prong, as both can serve to 
protect a person who no longer has, or never had, any actual “disability.” Specifically, when 
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B.   The Underlying Philosophy and Purpose of the  
“Regarded As” Protection 
 Beyond understanding the basic provisions and meaning of the 
ADA’s “regarded as” protection, it is also important to recognize Con-
gress’s mindset and motivation for granting protection to those who 
have either no impairment at all or, at most, a nondisabling impair-
ment. In other words: (1) What was the central congressional philos-
ophy behind providing discrimination protection to those who are not 
actually or in reality disabled and who thus otherwise would not pos-
sess the ADA’s protected trait? and (2) What was the primary pur-
pose or rationale for providing such discrimination protection to those 
who are not actually or in reality disabled and who thus otherwise 
would not possess the ADA’s protected trait?  
 As to the first question, the ADA’s legislative history effectively il-
lustrates the philosophical principle at the heart of the “regarded as” 
protection—that is, employer perception or stereotype is an appro-
priate justification for imposing employment discrimination liability, 
even when that perception or stereotype is erroneous and inaccurate. 
For example, the Committee on the Judiciary expressly stated that 
“[t]he perception of the [employer] is a key element” for imposing 
ADA-based employment discrimination liability.22 Illustrating this 
perception-based philosophy, the committee emphasized that “a per-
son who is rejected from a job because of the myths, fears and stereo-
types associated with disabilities would be covered . . . , whether or 
not the person’s physical or mental condition would be considered a 
disability” under the ADA.23
 Similarly, the Committee on Education and Labor stressed this 
central philosophy of targeting an employer’s erroneous perception 
over an employee’s reality for purposes of employment discrimination 
liability:  
                                                                                                                    
enacting the ADA, Congress noted that the “record of” protection was designed to cover 
“those who have” (1) “a history of an impairment” that rises to the level of an actual “disa-
bility,” such as those who have “recovered” from that impairment, or (2) those who other-
wise have “been misclassified as having an impairment,” such as those “who have been 
misclassified as mentally retarded.” H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 52-53; H.R. REP. NO.
101-485(III), at 29; see also EEOC Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Pro-
visions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(k) app. (explaining simi-
larly that the “record of” prong is intended to protect individuals from discrimination (1) 
“because of a history of disability” or (2) “because they have been misclassified as disabled” 
or subject to “erroneous classification” as disabled). 
 22. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(III), at 30. 
 23. Id.; see also id. at 45 (highlighting similarly that “person[s] . . . must not be ex-
cluded . . . based on stereotypes or fear” and that “[d]ecisions are not permitted to be based 
on generalizations” concerning the employee’s disability). 
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[Employers] are required to make employment decisions . . . not on 
the basis of presumptions as to what a class of individuals with 
disabilities can or cannot do. 
The Act is premised on the obligation of employers to consider 
people with disabilities as individuals and to avoid prejudging 
what an applicant or employee can or cannot do on the basis of 
that individual’s appearance or any other easily identifiable cha-
racteristic, or on a preconceived and often erroneous judgment 
about an individual’s capabilities based on “labeling” of that per-
son as having a particular kind of disability.24
 As to the second question, the ADA and its legislative history also 
explain the “regarded as” protection’s primary purpose or rationale. 
As an initial point, the overarching goals of Congress when enacting 
the ADA were to provide (1) “a clear and comprehensive national 
mandate for the elimination of [disability-based] discrimination” and 
(2) “clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards addressing dis-
crimination.”25 According to Congress, this “clear and comprehensive” 
prohibition on disability-based discrimination was in response to a 
“compelling need.”26
 Having established this goal of an unequivocal and complete pro-
hibition on disability discrimination, Congress used the “regarded as” 
protection to target one piece or part of the discrimination problem—
namely, the subset of employers that engaged in perception-based or 
                                                                                                                    
 24. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 58 (stating also that “[i]t would also be a violation to 
deny employment to an applicant based on generalized fears about the safety of the appli-
cant or higher rates of absenteeism” because “[o]ften, group-based fears are erroneous”); 
see also id. at 53 (“A person who is . . . discriminated against, because of [an employer’s] 
negative attitudes toward that person’s impairment is treated as having a disability. Thus, 
for example, if an employer refuses to hire someone . . . because of the employer’s percep-
tion that the applicant has an impairment which prevents that person from working, that 
person is covered . . . .”); id. at 72-73 (“In order to assure that misconceptions do not bias 
the employment selection process, the legislation sets forth a process which begins with a 
prohibition on pre-offer medical examinations or inquiries.”); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(III), at 
42-43 (“In order to assure that misconceptions do not bias the employment selection 
process, this section sets up a process that begins with the prohibition of pre-employment 
medical examinations or inquiries.”); EEOC Regulations to Implement the Equal Employ-
ment Provisions of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(l) app. (2008) 
(stating that a person would be protected if an employer “made an employment decision 
because of a perception of disability based on ‘myth, fear or stereotype’ ”). 
 25. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)-(2); see also id. § 12101(a)(2), (a)(8) (finding, respectively, 
that disability-based discrimination “continue[s] to be a serious and pervasive social prob-
lem” and that the “Nation’s proper goals . . . are to assure equality of opportunity” to those 
with disabilities); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 22 (stating also that “[t]he purpose of the 
ADA is to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate to end discrimination 
against individuals with disabilities”); H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(III), at 23 (stating also that 
“[t]he purpose of the [ADA] is to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate to 
end discrimination against individuals with disabilities”); id. at 26 (stating that “[t]he ADA 
is a comprehensive piece of civil rights legislation which promises a new future: a future of 
inclusion and integration, and the end of exclusion and segregation”). 
 26. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 28, 50. 
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stereotype-based discrimination.27 Specifically, Congress observantly 
recognized that perception-based or stereotype-based discrimination 
can, and does, occur. For example, the Committee on the Judiciary 
noted that “stereotypes and misconceptions about the abilities and 
inabilities of persons with disabilities continue to be pervasive. Dis-
crimination occurs against persons with disabilities because of ste-
reotypes, discomfort, misconceptions, and fears.”28 Continuing to em-
phasize this reality, the committee also stated that “many of the 
problems faced by disabled people are . . . the result of discriminatory 
policies based on unfounded, outmoded stereotypes and perceptions.”29
 Similarly, the Committee on Education and Labor recognized the 
existence of, and need to address, perception-based or stereotype-
based discrimination. For example, the committee observed that 
“[d]iscrimination against people with disabilities . . . often results 
from false presumptions, generalizations, misperceptions, patroniz-
ing attitudes, ignorance, irrational fears, and pernicious mytholo-
gies”30 as well as “stereotypical assumptions, fears and myths not 
truly indicative of the ability of such individuals.”31 Indeed, Congress 
expressly acknowledged the reality of perception-based or stereotype-
based discrimination in the ADA itself, as the Act’s “Findings” sec-
tion notes that disabled persons “have been faced with restrictions 
and limitations . . . [and] subjected to a history of purposeful unequal 
treatment, . . . resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly in-
dicative of the individual ability of such individuals.”32
 In sum, via the ADA’s “regarded as” protection, an employer that 
perceives a person as having an actual disability and then discrimi-
nates based on that perception is not allowed to escape liability just 
because its perception was inaccurate and the employee’s “reality” 
was different. This protection reflects the central congressional phi-
losophy that employer perception or stereotype is an appropriate jus-
tification for imposing employment discrimination liability, even 
when that perception or stereotype is erroneous or inaccurate. By 
ferreting out this subset of discriminators, it serves as a necessary 
                                                                                                                    
 27. See Leonard v. Katsinas, No. 05-1069, 2007 WL 1106136, at *12 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 
2007) (“Providing protection to even those who are erroneously identified as disabled was 
apparently necessary, in Congress’ vision, to achieve the ADA’s stated purpose of ‘[provid-
ing] a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination 
against individuals with disabilities[.]’ ” (alteration in original)). 
 28. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(III), at 31; see also H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 71 (mak-
ing the same substantive statement). 
 29. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(III), at 25. 
 30. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 30. 
 31. Id. at 40; see also id. at 33 (stating that “the major categories of job discrimination 
faced by people with disabilities include: . . . refusal to hire based on presumptions, stereo-
types and myths”). 
 32. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (2006). 
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piece of the ADA’s “clear and comprehensive” prohibition against 
disability-based discrimination.  
III.   VARYING JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF “REGARDED AS” CLAIMS 
UNDER OTHER FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS
 In contrast to the ADA, neither Title VII nor the ADEA contains 
any explicit language granting “regarded as” protection and cover-
age.33 This absence of an express “regarded as” protection has led 
courts to the proverbial “fork in the road” when addressing non-ADA 
employment discrimination claims based on an employer’s erroneous 
perception as to a plaintiff’s protected category or trait. A court can 
take the path to the left, rejecting these claims based on the lack of 
an explicit “regarded as” protection. Or, a court can take the path to 
the right, recognizing these claims notwithstanding this lack of an 
express “regarded as” protection. 
A.   Judicial Rejection of Non-ADA “Regarded As” Claims 
 Many courts have taken the path to the left. Such courts reject 
non-ADA “regarded as” claims and view plaintiffs who are erroneous-
ly perceived or stereotyped as (1) being of a certain race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin or (2) being at least forty years old as not 
even meeting the “protected group, class or trait” element of a prima 
facie case for employment discrimination purposes.34
 This path is nicely reflected in a recent New York federal district 
court’s decision in Lewis v. North General Hospital.35 In Lewis, the 
district court confronted a Title VII religious discrimination claim, in 
which the plaintiff who was “not Muslim”36 alleged that he had been 
erroneously “ ‘perceived to be a Muslim’ ” by his employer and then 
“subjected to discrimination” because of that perceived religious affil-
iation.37 In support of his claim, the plaintiff—whose legal name dur-
ing employment was “Serh Talmadge Farid Efe”38—asserted that his 
employer’s inaccurate perception was evidenced by a co-worker’s 
                                                                                                                    
 33. See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006) (not mentioning “regarded as” protection 
within the ADEA’s provisions); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006) (same as to Title VII). 
 34. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, the Supreme Court, addressing a Title VII 
race discrimination claim, explained that a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of racial 
employment discrimination by showing the following: (1) “he [or she] belongs to a racial 
minority”; (2) “he [or she] applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was 
seeking applicants”; (3) “he [or she] was rejected”; and (4) after the rejection, “the position 
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complai-
nant’s qualifications.” 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
 35. 502 F. Supp. 2d 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).  
 36. Id. at 392. 
 37. Id. at 394; see also id. at 401 (noting also the plaintiff’s testimony that he was 
“discriminated against because of . . . the Hospital’s ‘perception’ that he was Muslim”). 
 38. Id. at 393. 
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statement that “someone with the name ‘Talmadge’ had been affi-
liated with Malcolm X.”39 The employer subsequently moved for 
summary judgment as to the plaintiff’s claims.40
 The court granted summary judgment to the employer as to the 
plaintiff’s “perceived religion” claim under Title VII.41 Quickly con-
cluding that such a claim “fails as a matter of law,” the court focused 
exclusively on the absence of any express “regarded as” protection 
within Title VII: 
[T]he protections of Title VII do not extend to persons who are 
merely “perceived” to belong to a protected class. In the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, Congress provided for claims based on a 
“perceived” disability or being “regarded as” having a disability. If 
Congress had wanted to permit a similar cause of action under 
Title VII for “perceived religion” discrimination, it could have so 
provided. It did not.42
 Another example of a court taking this path is a Tennessee federal 
district court in Butler v. Potter.43 In Butler, the district court faced a 
Title VII race and national origin discrimination claim, in which the 
plaintiff who was “a white Caucasian”44 and “not of Arab, Indian, or 
Middle Eastern descent”45 asserted that he had been subjected to dis-
crimination and a hostile work environment by his employer “on the 
basis of his [inaccurately] perceived race and/or national origin.”46 In 
support of his claims, the plaintiff alleged that his employer’s errone-
ous perception was evidenced by (1) one supervisor “accus[ing] him of 
being Indian or Middle Eastern,”47 (2) another supervisor indicating 
that “he also thought plaintiff was an Arab,”48 and (3) supervisors 
asking him “questions about his prominent nose.”49 At summary 
judgment, the employer argued that the plaintiff did not actually be-
long to a protected class for purposes of his Title VII claim.50
                                                                                                                    
 39. Id. at 401. 
 40. Id. at 392. 
 41. Id. at 401. 
 42. Id. (citations omitted). 
 43. 345 F. Supp. 2d 844 (E.D. Tenn. 2004).  
 44. Id. at 846. 
 45. Id. at 850 (stating also that “[i]t is undisputed that plaintiff is neither of Indian 
nor Middle Eastern origin”). 
 46. Id.; see also id. at 847 (noting that the plaintiff had alleged “national origin (per-
ceived as Arab or Indian) . . . as [one of the] bases of discrimination”); id. at 848 (noting 
that the plaintiff had claimed “race (presumed Arabic) [and] national origin (presumed 
Arabic) . . . as [two of] the bases of discrimination” and asserted “perceived race and/or na-
tional origin discrimination”). 
 47. Id. at 846. 
 48. Id. at 846 n.1. 
 49. Id. at 850. 
 50. See id.
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 The court granted summary judgment to the employer as to the 
plaintiff’s “perceived race and/or national origin” claims under Title 
VII.51 Like the Lewis court, the Butler court succinctly rejected such 
claims and solely based its decision on the absence of any explicit 
“perceived as” protection within Title VII: 
Title VII protects those persons that belong to a protected class 
and says nothing about protection of persons who are perceived to 
belong to a protected class. . . . Congress has shown, through the . . 
. Americans with Disabilities Act, that it knows how to enact legis-
lation that protects persons who are wrongly perceived to be in a 
protected class. Neither party has cited any controlling authority 
which would permit a claim for perceived race or national origin 
discrimination and this Court is unaware of any such precedent.52
 In addition to the Lewis and Butler courts, other federal district 
courts in Georgia,53 Illinois,54 and New York55 have rejected (or oth-
                                                                                                                    
 51. Id.
 52. Id. (citation omitted). 
 53. See Uddin v. Univ. Avionics Sys. Corp., No. 1:05-CV-1115-TWT, 2006 WL 
1835291, at *1, *6 (N.D. Ga. June 30, 2006). The Uddin case involved a Title VII claim 
where an Indian plaintiff alleged discrimination based on being erroneously “perceived [as 
of Middle Eastern] race, ethnicity, and/or national origin.” Id. at *6. The court rejected 
these claims, stating that “Title VII does not explicitly protect persons who are perceived to 
belong to a protected class. Additionally, Plaintiff has not cited any controlling authority 
which would permit a claim for perceived race or national origin discrimination, and this 
Court is unaware of any such precedent.” Id. While dismissing these perception-based 
claims, the court permitted the plaintiff’s Title VII color and religion discrimination claims, 
reasoning that he “in actuality has a dark complexion and is a Muslim.” Id. (emphasis added). 
 54. See McIntosh v. Ill. Dep’t of Employment Sec., No. 05-C-7044, 2007 WL 1958577, 
at *5 (N.D. Ill. July 2, 2007) (rejecting a Title VII claim where an African-American plain-
tiff alleged discrimination based on being erroneously perceived as of “Spanish” national 
origin and stating that (1) the “attributes” leading to the perception “must still correlate 
with a plaintiff’s [actual] country of origin or that of his or her ancestors” and (2) as a re-
sult, the plaintiff, as an African-American, could not rely upon her frequent “use of the 
Spanish language” as a “springboard for a claim that [the employer] took issue with her ac-
tual national origin” (emphasis added)); Leonard v. Katsinas, No. 05-1069, 2007 WL 
1106136, at *1, *13 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 2007) (involving a § 1981 claim where purported “Na-
tive American” plaintiffs alleged discrimination based on race and heritage, and stating 
that (1) “Plaintiffs will bear the burden of proving at trial . . . that they are members of the 
protected class” and “actually of Native American ancestry,” (2) “unlike with the ADA, 
there is no express protection in § 1981, or Title VII for that matter, for individuals ‘re-
garded as’ members of a protected class,” and (3) Congress’s failure to “amend Title VII or 
§ 1981 to correspondingly widen the scope of statutory protection is some suggestion that it 
regards actual membership within a protected class a mandatory requirement to prevail 
under those statutes” (emphasis added)). 
 Interestingly, the Leonard court tried to compromise on the issue of non-ADA “re-
garded as” employment discrimination claims. As mentioned above, the court ultimately 
rejected such claims by requiring that the plaintiffs prove they were “actually of Native 
American ancestry” in order to prevail at the trial phase of their § 1981 claim. See id. at *1, 
*13 (emphasis added). 
 However, the court required no such showing in order to survive the summary judg-
ment phase. Id. at *12. Stating that “a focus on the perceptions of the alleged discriminator 
is appropriate at this stage,” id. (emphasis added), the court allowed the plaintiffs to defeat 
summary judgment based solely on their showing that the employer “believed [them] to be 
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erwise questioned) the viability of non-ADA employment discrimina-
tion claims that are based upon an employer’s erroneous perception 
or stereotype of a plaintiff’s protected category or trait. 
B.   Judicial Recognition of Non-ADA “Regarded As” Claims 
 In contrast, some jurisdictions have taken the path to the right at 
the fork in the road. Such courts recognize non-ADA “regarded as” 
claims and conclude that a plaintiff whom an employer erroneously 
perceives or stereotypes as falling within a particular protected 
group or class still satisfies the “protected group, class or trait” ele-
ment of a prima facie case for employment discrimination purposes.  
 This path is perhaps best illustrated by an Ohio federal district 
court’s decision in Perkins v. Lake County Department of Utilities.56
In Perkins, the district court confronted a Title VII race and national 
origin claim, in which the plaintiff, a purported “American Indian,” 
asserted that his employer had discriminated against him based on 
that very “status as an American Indian.”57 Consequently, the plain-
tiff had not originally alleged any erroneous employer perception as 
the basis for his Title VII claim.58 However, in a motion for summary 
judgment, the employer made two arguments regarding the plain-
tiff’s failure to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimi-
nation: (1) he was “not, in fact, an American Indian” and thus “not . . 
                                                                                                                    
Native Americans.” Id. (stating also that it was “not necessary to determine” the plaintiffs’ 
Native American status “at this point so long as ‘there is some objective evidence reflective 
of a basis for’ [the employer’s] purported belief that the Plaintiffs’ [sic] are Native Ameri-
can” (quoting Perkins v. Lake County Dep’t of Utilities, 860 F. Supp. 1262, 1278 (N.D. Ohio 
1994))). In support of this compromise for summary judgment purposes, the court empha-
sized federal antidiscrimination policy: 
[I]f there is evidence that an alleged discriminator believed the plaintiffs to be a 
[sic] members of a [protected] class—in this case, Native Americans—and dis-
criminated against them based on this belief, should it even matter if the plain-
tiffs are actually members of that protected class or not? Anti-discrimination 
statutes like § 1981 were undoubtedly drafted to curb certain actions grounded 
in racial animus, and prohibited racial animus should arguably be no less ac-
tionable if carried out in a case of mistaken identity. 
Id. at *9. 
 55. See Berrios v. Hampton Bay Union Free Sch. Dist., No. CV 02-3124, 2007 WL 
778165, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2007) (involving a Title VII claim where a plaintiff al-
leged discrimination based on being erroneously “perceived to be a witch, that is, a person 
who practices the Wiccan religion” and stating that (1) “a claim based upon a ‘perceived’ re-
ligious belief may not state a viable claim under Title VII” because the Act “makes no spe-
cific provision including those who are ‘perceived’ to belong to a particular religion as fall-
ing within a protected class” and (2) as a result, a jury finding in favor of the plaintiff on 
the “perceived religion claim . . . can be the subject of appeal”).  
 56. 860 F. Supp. 1262 (N.D. Ohio 1994).  
 57. Id. at 1263. 
 58. See id.
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. a member of a class protected by Title VII”;59 and (2) he was not a 
member of a protected class by virtue of “his and his employer’s mis-
taken belief that he [was] an American Indian.”60
 The court denied summary judgment to the employer on the 
plaintiff’s Title VII claim.61 While expressing uncertainty on the first 
issue of whether the plaintiff was actually “American Indian,”62 the 
court turned to the second question and clearly stated that “it is the 
employer’s reasonable belief that a given employee is a member of a 
protected class that controls this issue” for prima facie discrimination 
claim purposes.63
 The court offered two reasons for its position. First, the court rec-
ognized the common and “important role” that employer perception 
plays in employment discrimination, particularly in racial discrimi-
nation.64 Noting the inextricable relationship between an employer’s 
perception and employment discrimination, the court explained: 
It is the skin color leading to the perception that the person is “dif-
ferent” from the white majority that leads to discrimination. 
 . . . . 
 . . . [S]ubjective perception of an individual’s race clearly plays 
an important role in racial classification where discrimination is 
involved. This Court has never encountered an instance in which 
an employer admittedly first checked the pedigree of an employee 
before engaging in discriminatory conduct.65
As a result, the Perkins court viewed “perception and appearance [as] 
everything” for Title VII purposes66 and concluded that “[o]bjective 
appearance and employer perception are the basis for discrimination 
and . . . the key factors relevant to enforcing rights granted members 
of a protected class.”67
                                                                                                                    
 59. Id. at 1264 (emphasis added). The employer submitted evidence “that neither 
Plaintiff nor his immediate family are members of any tribe, live in an Indian community, 
or participate in Indian cultural events.” Id. at 1276.  
 60. Id. at 1265 (emphasis added). 
 61. Id. at 1277-78. 
 62. Id. at 1265 (stating that “the present answer” on that issue is “an equivocal ‘maybe’ ”). 
 63. Id. at 1277 (stating also that the plaintiff’s protected class status “does not turn 
upon [his] ability to prove lineage”). According to the court, there must be “some objective 
basis” (such as “physical appearance, language, cultural activities, or associations”) that 
“lead[s] the employer to believe that a given employee is a member of that protected class.” 
Id. at 1278 (stating also that “for purposes of entitlement to relief under Title VII this 
Court deems it unnecessary, and indeed inappropriate, to attempt to measure Plaintiff’s 
percentage of Indian blood or to examine his documentable connection to recognized exist-
ing tribes”). 
 64. See id. at 1273. 
 65. Id.
 66. Id. at 1277. 
 67. Id. at 1278; see also id. at 1277-78 (noting that “[a]s with the joy of beauty, the ug-
liness of bias can be in the eye of the beholder”). 
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 Second, the court discussed Title VII’s antidiscrimination purpose 
and policy and alluded to the role that perception-based claims have 
in promoting that policy. Specifically, the court stated that Title VII’s 
purpose is “to equalize the position of all employees, be they Native 
American, African-American, Hispanic, Asian or white” by address-
ing “perceived differences which do not have a basis in fact between 
races and ethnic groups.”68 Implicitly questioning whether this pur-
pose and policy would be furthered if misperception-based employ-
ment discrimination claims were rejected, the court asked: 
Would it be a defense if an employer fired a plaintiff because the 
employer disliked African-Americans and believed the plaintiff, 
due to his dark skin, to be a member of that group, when, in fact, 
the plaintiff was a black Asian Indian, a group against which the 
employer did not intend to discriminate? . . . In that example the 
desire to engage in unlawful discrimination is present, but the 
prima facie case is riddled with holes if the employer’s perceptions 
in taking those steps is [sic] not considered to be a part of the dis-
crimination equation.69
Consequently, the court viewed its conclusion of recognizing errone-
ous perception-based employment discrimination claims as “logically 
follow[ing] . . . [from] Title VII’s attempt to equalize the footing of all 
employees without regard to the employer’s subjective perceptions 
and preconceived ideas.”70
 Having recognized the viability of “regarded as” claims under 
Title VII, the court concluded that the plaintiff had “demonstrated a 
genuine factual issue as to his membership in a protected class” for 
purposes of surviving summary judgment.71 Specifically, the court 
noted that “it appear[ed] to be unquestioned that the Plaintiff’s phys-
ical appearance could be considered that of a Native American . . . 
and, most importantly, that he was considered by his employer and 
his co-workers to be Native American.”72
 In addition, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Estate of Amos v. City 
of Page73 nicely reflects this path of recognizing “regarded as” dis-
crimination claims, albeit not in a federal employment discrimination 
context. In Estate of Amos, the Ninth Circuit faced a § 1983 claim74
                                                                                                                    
 68. Id. at 1276.  
 69. Id. at 1277 n.17.  
 70. Id. at 1278. 
 71. Id.
 72. Id.
 73. 257 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 74. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (stating, in relevant part, that “[e]very person who, under 
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects . . . 
any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuni-
ties secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action 
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress”). 
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alleging race discrimination in violation of Amos’s equal protection 
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.75 Specifically, the trustee 
for Amos’s estate asserted that City police officers had “cut short” a 
post-car accident search for Amos (who was “white”) because they 
“mistakenly believed he was Native American.”76
 According to the claim, the City had a “discriminatory policy,” as 
allegedly “it [was] standard practice for the City . . . not to search for 
runaway drivers because the City believe[d] that most runaway driv-
ers [were] Native Americans who bolt to the Navajo Reservation af-
ter an accident.”77 In its motion to dismiss this claim, the City argued 
that the trustee lacked standing to assert this race discrimination 
claim because Amos “was not a member” of the “protected class of 
persons” against whom the City’s policy purportedly discriminated.78
 The Ninth Circuit denied the City’s motion to dismiss the claim.79
Noting that Amos was allegedly “the direct target of discrimination 
based on mistaken racial identity,”80 the court concluded that “for 
purposes of standing, Amos should be viewed as [the] Trustee alleges 
the police officers viewed him: as a Native American.”81 In support of 
its recognition of this erroneous perception-based discrimination 
claim, the Ninth Circuit provided this succinct yet insightful com-
ment regarding erroneous perception-based actors: “[A]lleged dis-
crimination is no less malevolent because it was based upon an erro-
neous assumption.”82
 Beyond the Perkins court and the Ninth Circuit, other federal 
courts in North Carolina83 and Michigan84—in addition to the EEOC 
as the federal administrative agency that, in part, enforces Title VII 
                                                                                                                    
 75. Estate of Amos, 257 F.3d at 1089, 1093. 
 76. Id.
 77. Id.; see also id. at 1090 (noting that the city attorney had allegedly stated that it 
was “standard practice for the police not to conduct thorough searches for runaway drivers 
because they suspect most are Native Americans”). 
 78. Id. at 1093. 




 83. See Greene v. Swain County P’ship for Health, 342 F. Supp. 2d 442, 446-47, 451 
(W.D.N.C. 2004). The Greene case involved a Title VII and § 1981 case where a purportedly 
Native American plaintiff alleged discrimination based on that very status. Id. at 446. The 
court followed Perkins, stating that (1) the plaintiff could prove “she was a member of a 
protected class” for prima facie case purposes solely by showing her employer “had a basis 
to reasonably believe” that she was Native American and (2) “the employer’s reasonable 
belief and knowledge that the employee is a member of a protected class is central to the 
employee’s claim.” Id. at 451. 
 84. See Eriksen v. Allied Waste Sys., Inc., No. 06-13549, 2007 WL 1003851, at *3, *6 
(E.D. Mich. Apr. 2, 2007) (involving a Michigan Elliott-Larson Civil Rights Act (MELCRA) 
case where a purportedly Native American plaintiff alleged discrimination based on that 
very status, and allowing the plaintiff to survive summary judgment due to “sufficient evi-
dence” that “she is or was perceived to be Native American” (emphasis added)). 
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and the ADEA85—have recognized the viability of non-ADA employ-
ment discrimination claims based upon an employer’s erroneous per-
ception or stereotype as to a plaintiff’s protected category or trait.86
                                                                                                                    
 85. See, e.g., EEOC, COMPLIANCE MANUAL, § 15-II (2006), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/race-color.html (stating that “Title VII’s prohibition of race 
discrimination generally encompasses . . . [e]mployment discrimination against an individ-
ual based on a belief that the individual is a member of a particular racial group . . . . Dis-
crimination against an individual based on a perception of his or her race violates Title VII 
even if that perception is wrong” (emphasis added)); EEOC, COMPLIANCE MANUAL, § 13-II.B 
(2002), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/national-origin.html (stating that 
“[e]mployment discrimination against a national origin group includes discrimination 
based on . . . the employer’s belief that [an individual] is a member of a particular national 
origin group, for example, discrimination against someone perceived as being Arab based 
on his speech, mannerisms, and appearance, regardless of . . . whether he is, in fact, of Arab 
ethnicity” (emphasis added)); id. § 13-II.C (discussing an example case where an Egyptian 
plaintiff “has been subjected to derogatory comments about Islam even though he has told 
his coworkers that he is Christian,” and stating that the plaintiff’s claim should assert “re-
ligious discrimination”); see also Charity Williams, Note, Misperceptions Matter: Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Protects Employees from Discrimination Based on Misper-
ceived Religious Status, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 357, 371 (discussing religion-based discrimina-
tion claims under Title VII and noting that “[t]he EEOC has provided clear guidance that 
employment discrimination based on the misperceptions of an employee’s race, national 
origin, or religion violates Title VII”). 
 While the EEOC’s Compliance Manual embraces “regarded as” protection for pur-
poses of Title VII, the EEOC’s implementing regulations for Title VII are less clear on this 
issue. For example, these regulations, in part, state that “national origin discrimination” 
includes “denial of an equal employment opportunity [1] because of an individual’s, or his 
or her ancestors,’ place of origin; or [2] because an individual has the physical, cultural or 
linguistic characteristics of a national origin group.” 29 C.F.R. § 1606.1 (2008) (emphasis 
added). At an absolute minimum, this “characteristics” language would encompass dis-
crimination where an employer’s perceptions regarding an employee’s national origin-
based “characteristics” happen to match, or coincide with, his or her actual national origin. 
Indeed, many courts citing this regulatory language have addressed discrimination claims 
where the perceived “characteristics” matched the employee’s actual protected trait or sta-
tus. See, e.g., Almendares v. Palmer, No. 3:00-CV-7524, 2002 WL 31730963, at *9-10 (N.D. 
Ohio Dec. 3, 2002) (involving a Title VII case alleging national origin-based discrimination, 
citing the EEOC’s regulatory language, and noting that the plaintiffs’ “linguistic characte-
ristics” and “Spanish-speaking characteristics reflect their national origin”); Holness v. 
Penn State Univ., No. 98-2484, 1999 WL 270388, at *6 (E.D. Pa. May 5, 1999) (involving a 
Title VII case alleging national origin-based discrimination, citing the EEOC’s regulatory 
language, and noting that the plaintiff “clearly possesses, at the very least, the linguistic 
characteristics of his place of national origin[, Jamaica]”); Harel v. Rutgers, State Univ., 5 
F. Supp. 2d 246, 269 (D.N.J. 1998) (involving a § 1983 case alleging national origin-based 
discrimination, citing the EEOC’s regulatory language, and noting that the plaintiff’s “cha-
racteristics” of being “raised in Israel,” “speak[ing] English with a discernible accent,” and 
“clearly identif[ying] with his Israeli culture” reflected his Israeli status). 
 But, the lingering question is: Does this regulatory “characteristics” language also 
encompass a true “regarded as” situation, where an employer’s perceptions regarding an 
employee’s national origin-based “characteristics” do not match or coincide with his or her 
actual national origin? Not necessarily. After all, unlike the EEOC’s Compliance Manual, 
the EEOC regulations are dead silent on the issue of employer perceptions (especially 
those that are mistaken or inaccurate) and thus give no insight or guidance as to the true 
“regarded as” situation. See also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1 (2008) (containing regulatory language 
similarly silent on employer “perception” as to sex-based discrimination under Title VII); 
id. § 1605.1 (containing regulatory language similarly silent on employer “perception” as to 
religion-based discrimination under Title VII). Nonetheless, some courts have seized upon 
the regulatory “characteristics” language as support for recognizing non-ADA “regarded 
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IV.   THE ARGUMENT FOR EXTENDING “REGARDED AS” PROTECTION 
UNDER FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
 As evidenced by this varying treatment of non-ADA “regarded as” 
claims, there is no consistent judicial view regarding (1) the availa-
bility of protection for persons who are subject to erroneous percep-
tion-based or stereotype-based discrimination under Title VII or the 
ADEA and (2) the imposition of liability upon employers who engage 
in such conduct. While employees and applicants in Ohio, North Car-
olina, and Michigan (and perhaps even in the states comprising the 
Ninth Circuit)87 may receive “regarded as” protection (with employers 
being subject to “regarded as” liability) outside the ADA context, em-
ployees or applicants in Georgia, Illinois, New York, and Tennessee 
may be denied such protection (with employers avoiding such liabili-
ty).88 And, as to the employees, applicants, and employers in the do-
zens of remaining states, they are—and will remain—in limbo status 
concerning “regarded as” protection and liability under Title VII and 
the ADEA until courts in those jurisdictions confront this issue. 
 The ADA’s concept of “regarded as” protection should be judicially 
(and, if necessary, legislatively) extended under federal employment 
                                                                                                                    
as” claims. See, e.g., Eriksen, 2007 WL 1003851, at *6 (quoting the EEOC’s regulations and 
viewing them as “support for a broad definition of the term ‘national origin’ ” and the fact 
that “national origin discrimination is not based on the actual national origin of the plain-
tiff, but rather on the perceived characteristics of the plaintiff leading the alleged discrimi-
nator to treat the plaintiff differently”); Perkins v. Lake County Dep’t of Utils., 860 F. 
Supp. 1262, 1273 (N.D. Ohio 1994) (quoting the EEOC’s regulations and viewing them as 
evidence that “perception plays an important role in determining who is a member of a mi-
nority group for purposes of Title VII” and that “physical characteristics associated with a 
particular nationality may be all that is necessary to show membership in a class”). 
 86. See Leonard v. Katsinas, No. 05-1069, 2007 WL 1106136, at *10 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 
2007) (recognizing that “[i]n some cases, a plaintiff’s . . . claims under other discrimination 
statutes have hinged on the defendant’s perception”); Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc., 200 F. 
Supp. 2d 151, 170 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (same); Andrew M. Carlon, Racial Adjudication, 2007 
BYU L. REV. 1151, 1190 (discussing race-based discrimination claims under Title VII and 
recognizing that some courts have “consider[ed] the plaintiff’s ‘subjective’ race, in the eyes 
of his employer, not his ‘objective’ race, what he ‘really is’ ” when ascertaining an individu-
al’s protected group or trait status); cf. EEOC v. Trans States Airlines, Inc., 462 F.3d 987, 
989, 992 (8th Cir. 2006) (involving a Title VII case where an Indian and Fijian plaintiff al-
leged discrimination based on being erroneously stereotyped as “of Arabic descent,” “as-
suming arguendo that a non-Arab might have an actionable claim under Title VII based on 
race or national origin if his ‘objective appearance to others’ was as an Arab”); Afshar v. 
Pinkerton Acad., No. Civ. 03-137-JD, 2004 WL 1969873, at *1, *3 n.2, *4 (D.N.H. Sept. 7, 
2004) (involving a Title VII case where a Bahai religion plaintiff alleged discrimination 
“based on a misperception that he was a Muslim,” noting that such claim was “indistin-
guishable from his claim of national origin discrimination,” for which the court concluded 
the plaintiff had satisfied “the requirements of a prima facie case”). 
 87. See supra Part III.B (discussing precedent and jurisdictions recognizing non-ADA 
“regarded as” claims). The Ninth Circuit is comprised of the following nine states: Alaska, 
Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington. 
 88. See supra Part III.A (discussing precedent and jurisdictions rejecting non-ADA 
“regarded as” claims). 
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discrimination law.89 The extension of this protection under Title VII 
and the ADEA is warranted for two primary reasons: (1) these other 
federal employment discrimination laws have long-shared with the 
ADA an identical congressional and judicial philosophy of imposing 
liability upon employers for erroneous perception-based or stereo-
type-based discrimination; and (2) the “regarded as” protection is ne-
cessary to capture an otherwise elusive subset of discriminating em-
ployers (i.e., the “erroneous discriminators”) and thus fully advance 
the comprehensive antidiscrimination purposes of these other laws. 
A.   Long-Shared Congressional and Judicial Philosophy of Imposing 
“Perception-Based” or “Stereotype-Based” Liability 
 As evidenced by the ADA’s legislative history, the “regarded as” 
protection reflects the central congressional philosophy that employ-
er perception or stereotype is an appropriate justification for impos-
ing employment discrimination liability, even when that perception 
or stereotype is erroneous and inaccurate.90 Labeling such employer 
perception as “a key element,”91 Congress openly targeted employ-
ment decisions that were based upon (1) “myths, fears and stereo-
types,”92 (2) “generalizations,”93 (3) “presumptions as to what a class 
of individuals with disabilities can or cannot do,”94 (4) “prejudging” or 
other “preconceived and . . . erroneous judgment about an individu-
al’s capabilities based on ‘labeling,’ ”95 (5) “negative attitudes,”96 or (6) 
“misconceptions.”97
                                                                                                                    
 89. While this issue has surprisingly not been the subject of extensive scholarship, 
certain commentators have recommended applying the “regarded as” concept to particular 
Title VII traits, such as race or religion. See, e.g., Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. 
Barnes, By Any Other Name?: On Being “Regarded As” Black, and Why Title VII Should 
Apply Even If Lakisha and Jamal Are White, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 1283, 1334 (discussing 
race-based discrimination claims under Title VII and arguing that the “same factors and 
principles [embodied by the ADA’s ‘regarded as’ protection] can and should be transferred 
to an analysis of ‘regarded as’ in disparate treatment race discrimination”); Williams, su-
pra note 85, at 358 (discussing religion-based discrimination claims under Title VII and 
arguing that “Title VII prohibits discrimination based on perceived religious status, 
whether or not the employer perceived the employee’s religion accurately”).  
 Of course, this Article argues for a much broader extension of “regarded as” protec-
tion (i.e., to all traits protected by Title VII and the ADEA). 
 90. See supra Part II.B (discussing the underlying philosophy of the ADA’s “regarded 
as” protection). 
 91. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(III), at 30 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 
453 (Comm. on the Judiciary). 
 92. Id.
 93. Id. at 45. 
 94. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 58 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 
332 (Comm. on Education and Labor). 
 95. Id.
 96. Id. at 53.  
 97. Id. at 72-73. 
848 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:827 
 Importantly, this central philosophy—the targeting of an employ-
er’s erroneous perception over an employee’s reality for purposes of 
imposing employment discrimination liability—is not only embodied 
in the ADA. Both the ADEA and Title VII share this identical philos-
ophy, as reflected in relevant legislative materials and applicable 
Supreme Court precedent.98
1.   The Philosophy Reflected in the ADEA 
 The ADEA’s language, its legislative history, and more recent 
congressional reports confirm the Act’s central philosophy of impos-
ing liability upon employers for erroneous perception-based or stereo-
type-based discrimination. 
 As a starting point, in the ADEA’s “statement of findings and 
purpose,” Congress generally observed that “arbitrary age limits re-
gardless of potential for job performance ha[d] become a common 
practice”99 and stated that one of the Act’s purposes was “to prohibit 
arbitrary age discrimination in employment.”100 Echoing these con-
cerns and purposes, the Education and Labor Committee stated that 
the ADEA was designed to “dispel[] [age-based employment prob-
lems] which are illusory” and “to promote the employment of older 
workers based on their ability.”101
 While such concerns about “arbitrary” age discrimination and “il-
lusory” employment problems can be broadly viewed as including er-
roneous or inaccurate employer beliefs, more recent congressional 
reports further substantiate the ADEA’s same philosophy of target-
ing an employer’s erroneous perception over an employee’s reality for 
purposes of imposing employment discrimination liability. For exam-
ple, in a recent 2004 legislative report (entitled “Developments in Ag-
ing: 2001 and 2002”), the Senate’s Special Committee on Aging dis-
cussed, in part, the status of age discrimination in the United 
States.102 Reiterating that “employment decisions regarding older 
persons should be based on individual assessments of each older 
worker’s potential or ability” rather than “arbitrary age limits,”103
Congress importantly highlighted, as the ADEA’s focus, the same er-
roneous perception-based or stereotype-based discrimination con-
cerns that are at the heart of the ADA:  
                                                                                                                    
 98. See infra Part IV.A.1-2 (discussing the legislative histories and Supreme Court 
precedent that reflect this central philosophy in the ADEA and Title VII). 
 99. 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(2) (2006). 
 100. Id. § 621(b). 
 101. H.R. REP. NO. 90-805, at 1 (1967), as reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2213, 2213 
(Comm. on Education and Labor). 
 102. S. REP. NO. 108-265(I), ch. 4.A (2004) (unavailable in U.S.C.C.A.N. but available 
at 2004 WL 3044796 (May 14, 2004)).  
 103. Id. ch. 4.A.3(A). 
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 Older workers continue to face numerous obstacles to  
employment, including negative stereotypes about aging and 
productivity . . . . 
 . . . .  
 . . . The pervasive belief that all abilities decline with age has 
fostered the myth that older workers are less efficient than young-
er workers. Because younger workers, rather than older workers, 
tend to receive the skills and training needed to keep up with 
technological changes, the myth continues. . . . 
 Too often, employers wrongly assume that it is not financially 
advantageous to retrain an older worker because they believe that 
a younger employee will remain on the job longer. In fact, the mo-
bility of today’s work force does not support this perception. . . .  
 . . . . 
 [There is] the continuing belief that older workers are less pro-
ductive . . . .104
 Beyond these congressional materials, Supreme Court precedent 
also underscores the ADEA’s identical underlying philosophy of im-
posing liability upon employers for erroneous perception-based or 
stereotype-based discrimination. For example, in Hazen Paper Co. v. 
Biggins,105 the Court addressed an ADEA claim, in which the plain-
tiff alleged that he had been subjected to age-based discrimination 
when he was discharged at sixty-two years old.106 At trial, the evi-
dence suggested that the employer had “fired [the plaintiff] in order 
to prevent his pension benefits from vesting,” as that “pension plan 
had a 10-year vesting period” that the plaintiff “would have reached . 
. . had he worked ‘a few more weeks’ after being fired.”107 The jury re-
turned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on his ADEA claim.108
                                                                                                                    
 104. Id. ch. 4.A.1; see also S. REP. NO. 102-28(I), at *91 (1991) (unavailable in 
U.S.C.C.A.N. but available at 1991 WL 52579 (Mar. 22, 1991)) (stating that “[f]or the most 
part, these obstacles [regarding ‘negative stereotypes about aging and productivity’] have 
their roots in age discrimination”). 
 The Senate’s Special Committee on Aging issued “Developments in Aging” reports 
for 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, 1996, 1997-98, 1999-2000, and 2001-02, and all of the re-
ports contain language similar, if not identical, to that quoted above from the Senate 
Committee on Aging 2004 Report. See S. REP. NO. 107-158(I), at *91 (2002) (unavailable in 
U.S.C.C.A.N. but available at 2002 WL 1266111 (June 4, 2002)); S. REP. No. 106-229(I), at 
*83 (2000) (unavailable in U.S.C.C.A.N. but available at 2000 WL 1700121 (Feb. 7, 2000)); 
S. REP. NO. 105-36(I), at *77 (1997) (unavailable in U.S.C.C.A.N. but available at 1997 WL 
374926 (June 24, 1997)); S. REP. NO. 103-403(I), at *87 (1994) (unavailable in U.S.C.C.A.N. 
but available at 1994 WL 577580 (Oct. 7, 1994)); S. REP. NO. 103-40(I), at *81 (1993) (un-
available in U.S.C.C.A.N. but available at 1993 WL 141520 (Apr. 20, 1993)); S. REP. NO.
102-261, ch. 4.A.1 (1992) (unavailable in U.S.C.C.A.N. but available at 1992 WL 74189 
(Mar. 12, 1992)); S. REP. NO. 102-28(I), at *91-92 (unavailable in U.S.C.C.A.N. but availa-
ble at 1991 WL 52579 (Mar. 22, 1991)); S. REP. NO. 101-249(I), ch. 4.A.1 (1990) (unavaila-
ble in U.S.C.C.A.N. but available at 1990 WL 263545 (Mar. 6, 1990)). 
 105. 507 U.S. 604 (1993). 
 106. Id. at 606. 
 107. Id. at 607.  
 108. Id. at 606. 
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 On appeal, the First Circuit affirmed, based, in part, on the fact 
that the jury could have “reasonably found that age was inextricably 
intertwined with the decision to fire [the plaintiff].”109 As a result, on 
certiorari, the Supreme Court was forced to answer the question of 
“whether an employer violates the ADEA by acting on the basis of a 
factor, such as an employee’s pension status or seniority, that is em-
pirically correlated with age.”110
 Responding in the negative and then remanding the case to the 
court of appeals, a unanimous Supreme Court repeatedly highlighted 
(1) the ADEA’s emphasis on age-based perceptions and stereotypes 
by employers and (2) the importance of these employer-held beliefs in 
the age discrimination context.111 For example, the Court acknowl-
edged that “Congress’ promulgation of the ADEA was prompted by 
its concern that older workers were being deprived of employment on 
the basis of inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes”112 and that age 
discrimination “was ‘based in large part on stereotypes unsupported 
by objective fact.’ ”113 As a result, the Court stated that “the very es-
sence of age discrimination” is when an older employee is “fired be-
cause the employer believes that productivity and competence decline 
with old age.”114
 In addition, the Court extended its discussion of these erroneous 
perception or stereotype issues in the context of the above-referenced 
question regarding factors “correlated with age.” Specifically, it 
stated that “the problem of inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes 
disappears” when the “motivating factor” for an employment decision 
is merely “correlated with age, as pension status typically is.”115 Simi-
larly, in noting that the employer (Hazen Paper) would not have en-
gaged in age-based disparate treatment if it had discharged the 
plaintiff “solely because he ha[d] nine-plus years of service and there-
fore [was] ‘close to vesting,’ ” the Court reasoned that “[t]he prohi-
bited stereotype (‘Older employees are likely to be ___’) would not 
have figured in this decision, and the attendant stigma would not en-
sue. The decision would not be the result of an inaccurate and deni-
grating generalization about age.”116
                                                                                                                    
 109. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 953 F.2d 1405, 1412 (1st Cir. 1992). 
 110. Hazen Paper Co., 507 U.S. at 608. 
 111. See id. at 610-14. 
 112. Id. at 610. 
 113. Id. at 610-11 (emphasis added) (quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226,  
231 (1983)).  
 114. Id. at 610 (emphasis added). 
 115. Id. at 611.  
 116. Id. at 612 (emphasis added); see also id. at 611 (explaining similarly that 
“[b]ecause age and years of service are analytically distinct, an employer can take account 
of one while ignoring the other, and thus it is incorrect to say that a decision based on 
years of service is necessarily ‘age based’ ”). For post-Hazen Paper Co. cases discussing the 
important role of perception and stereotype in ADEA discrimination cases, see Wexler v. 
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2.   The Philosophy Reflected in Title VII 
 As with the ADEA, Title VII also shares the ADA’s central philos-
ophy of targeting an employer’s erroneous perception over an em-
ployee’s reality for purposes of imposing employment discrimination 
liability. While Title VII’s concise language and legislative history do 
not expressly reference these concepts,117 Congress openly discussed 
these concerns when enacting the Title VII-amending Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act of 1978 (PDA). 
 The PDA amended Title VII to clarify that, for purposes of unlaw-
ful employment discrimination, the original term “because of sex” in-
cludes “because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related 
medical conditions.”118 Noting that the purpose of the PDA was “to 
ensure that working women are protected against all forms of em-
ployment discrimination based on sex,”119 Congress emphasized, as 
the Act’s focus, the same erroneous perception-based or stereotype-
based concerns that would be at the center of the ADA only twelve 
years later: 
[T]he assumption that women will become pregnant and leave the 
labor force leads to the view of women as marginal workers, and is 
at the root of the discriminatory practices which keep women in 
low-paying and dead[-]end jobs. 
 . . . .  
 . . . Women are still subject to the stereotype that all women are 
marginal workers. Until a woman passes the child-bearing age, 
she is viewed by employers as potentially pregnant. Therefore, the 
elimination of discrimination based on pregnancy in these em-
ployment practices . . . will go a long way toward providing equal 
                                                                                                                    
White’s Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564, 572 (6th Cir. 2003), which discusses certain em-
ployer comments that may have “adhered to the stereotype that an older manager cannot 
perform in a high-stress management position” and states that “[t]he eradication of such 
stigmatizing beliefs is precisely what the ADEA was intended to target”; id. at 596 (Kru-
pansky, J., dissenting), which states that “Congress’ exclusive, and commendable, purpose 
underlying the ADEA was to penalize, and thereby deter, unfounded, irrational employ-
ment discrimination against persons which was animated purely by bias, prejudice, and 
ignorance”; Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1046 (11th Cir. 2000) (Birch, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part), which notes that the employer’s “proffered reasons 
correspond strongly with the very stereotypes that the ADEA was designed to combat,” 
such as “[a] stereotype of older persons . . . not [being] ‘aggressive,’ such that employers 
frequently identify younger workers as ‘aggressive’ and, thus, more desirable than older 
workers”; Testerman v. EDS Technical Prod. Corp., 98 F.3d 297, 301 (7th Cir. 1996), which 
states that “the ADEA prohibits employment decisions based on ‘stigmatizing stereotypes,’ 
however benignly intended”; and EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1077 (7th 
Cir. 1994), which discusses Hazen Paper Co. and reiterates “the ADEA’s focus on eliminat-
ing decisions made based on stereotypes about age.”  
 117. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006); H.R. REP. NO. 88-914 (1963), 
as reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391 (Comm. on the Judiciary).  
 118. Pub. L. No. 95-555, § 1, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)). 
 119. H.R. REP. NO. 95-948, at 3 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 4751 
(Comm. on Education and Labor) (emphasis added). 
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employment opportunities for women, the goal of Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964.120
 Moreover, the legislative history of the PDA is not the only re-
source that confirms Title VII’s identical underlying philosophy of 
imposing liability upon employers for erroneous perception-based or 
stereotype-based discrimination. The Supreme Court has unders-
cored this same central philosophy in the Title VII context. 
 For example, in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,121 the Court ad-
dressed a Title VII claim, in which the female plaintiff alleged that 
she had been subjected to sex-based discrimination when she was not 
promoted to the status of partner at her accounting firm.122 At trial, 
the evidence suggested that some of the firm’s partners “reacted ne-
gatively” to the plaintiff based on gender-based stereotypes, as their 
comments in the promotion process included: (1) she “overcompen-
sated for being a woman”; (2) she should take “a course at charm 
school”; and (3) she should “walk more femininely, talk more femi-
ninely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, 
and wear jewelry.”123
 The district court concluded that the firm had engaged in sex-
based discrimination, because it gave effect to the “impermissibly ca-
bined view of the proper behavior of women” as evidenced by “part-
ners’ comments that resulted from sex stereotyping.”124 The D.C. Cir-
cuit affirmed.125
 While the Supreme Court primarily addressed the then hotly de-
bated issue of the requisite proof (and resulting degree of liability) in 
a “mixed motive” discrimination case126 and then remanded the case 
accordingly,127 it also provided substantial discussion regarding the 
relevance of employer-held perceptions or stereotypes in Title VII 
discrimination claims.128 Noting that Title VII reflected Congress’s 
“momentous announcement that sex, race, religion, and national ori-
gin are not relevant to the selection, evaluation, or compensation of 
employees,”129 the plurality succinctly observed that “[i]n the specific 
                                                                                                                    
 120. Id. at 3, 6-7. 
 121. 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
 122. Id. at 231-32. 
 123. Id. at 235.  
 124. Id. at 236-37. 
 125. Id. at 237. 
 126. See generally id. at 237-96 (presenting the plurality, concurring, and dissenting 
opinions of the Court on the “mixed motive” issue). A “mixed-motive” discrimination case 
involves “no one ‘true’ motive behind the decision. Instead, the decision is a result of mul-
tiple factors, at least one of which is legitimate.” Id. at 260 (White, J., concurring).  
 127. Id. at 258. 
 128. See id. at 250-51, 256-58.  
 129. Id. at 239 (stating similarly that “Title VII eliminates certain bases for distin-
guishing among employees”); see also id. at 240 (stating that “[w]e take [Title VII’s] words 
to mean that gender must be irrelevant to employment decisions”). 
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context of sex stereotyping, an employer who acts on the basis of a 
belief that a woman cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, 
has acted on the basis of gender.”130
 In addition, the plurality highlighted the significance of stereotyp-
ing in employment discrimination cases: 
As for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the 
day when an employer could evaluate employees by assuming or 
insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with their 
group, for “ ‘[i]n forbidding employers to discriminate against indi-
viduals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike at the en-
tire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting 
from sex stereotypes.’ ” 
 . . . [S]tereotyped remarks can certainly be evidence that gender 
played a part [in the employment decision].131
 Finally, the plurality extended its discussion of these erroneous 
perception or stereotype concerns in the context of the plaintiff’s sex 
discrimination claim. It candidly suggested that “[i]t takes no special 
training to discern sex stereotyping in a description of an aggressive 
female employee as requiring ‘a course at charm school’ ”132 nor does 
it “require expertise in psychology to know that, if an employee’s 
flawed ‘interpersonal skills’ can be corrected by a soft-hued suit or a 
new shade of lipstick, perhaps it is the employee’s sex . . . that has 
drawn the criticism.”133
                                                                                                                    
 130. Id. at 250 (emphasis added).  
 131. Id. at 251 (first alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Los Angeles 
Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)). 
 132. Id. at 256. 
 133. Id. (stating also that some of the partners’ comments “were motivated by stereo-
typical notions about women’s proper deportment”). For post-Price Waterhouse cases dis-
cussing the important role of perception and stereotype in Title VII discrimination cases, 
see Miller v. City of New York, 177 Fed. App’x 195, 196-97 (2d Cir. 2006), which notes that 
“discrimination on the basis of a failure to conform to sex stereotypes can evidence the sort 
of difference in treatment of persons of different genders that is actionable” and that com-
ments regarding the male plaintiff not being a “ ‘manly man’ ” or a “ ‘real man’ ” could lead 
a jury to conclude that “failure to conform to sex stereotypes was a reason for [the plaintiff] 
being discriminated against based on his gender”; Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 
572-75 (6th Cir. 2004), which notes that “[s]ex stereotyping based on a person’s gender 
non-conforming behavior is impermissible discrimination” and that comments regarding 
the male plaintiff’s “mannerisms and appearance” being “less masculine[] and more femi-
nine” were sufficient to allege sex-based discrimination “based on his failure to conform to 
sex stereotypes”; Margolis v. Tektronix, Inc., 44 Fed. App’x 138, 141 (9th Cir. 2002), which 
notes that “[s]exual stereotyping . . . can serve as evidence that gender played a role in the 
employer’s decision” and that comments regarding the female plaintiff being “ ‘pushy’ ” or 
“ ‘aggressive’ ” could suggest sex-based discrimination; and Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
183 F.3d 38, 42, 59 (1st Cir. 1999), which notes that “Title VII’s prohibition against ‘dispa-
rate treatment because of race’ extends . . . to employer decisions that are based on stereo-
typed thinking” and that “[s]tereotypes or cognitive biases based on race are as incompati-
ble with Title VII’s mandate as stereotypes based on age or sex.” See also MICHAEL J.
ZIMMER, CHARLES A. SULLIVAN & REBECCA HANNER WHITE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 82 n.9, 83 n.10 (6th ed. 2003) (noting, respectively, “the 
854 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:827 
 Thus, the legislative histories of the ADEA and Title VII (includ-
ing the Title VII-amending PDA) and applicable Supreme Court 
precedent evidence a striking similarity with the ADA as to termi-
nology and concerns regarding erroneous perception-based or stereo-
type-based discrimination. 
 When enacting the ADA (which expressly includes the “regarded 
as” protection), Congress repeatedly referred to concerns about com-
bating “myths, fears and stereotypes,” “generalizations,” “presump-
tions,” “prejudging,” “preconceived and . . . erroneous judgment . . . 
based on ‘labeling,’ ” “negative attitudes,” “misconceptions,” “un-
founded, outmoded stereotypes and perceptions,” “false presump-
tions, . . . misperceptions, patronizing attitudes, ignorance, irrational 
fears, and pernicious mythologies,” and “stereotypical assumptions.”134
 Such terminology and concerns similarly appear in the ADEA and 
Title VII contexts. Indeed, as to the ADEA, the terminology and age 
discrimination-related concerns discussed by both Congress (e.g., 
“negative stereotypes,” “pervasive belief,” “myth,” “wrong[] as-
sum[ptions],” and “perception”)135 and the Supreme Court (e.g., “inac-
curate and stigmatizing stereotypes,” “stereotypes unsupported by 
objective fact,” “stigma,” and “inaccurate and denigrating generaliza-
tion”)136 are virtually identical to, and interchangeable with, the ter-
minology and concerns referenced by Congress when discussing the 
ADA and the “regarded as” protection. Similarly, the Title VII termi-
nology and discrimination-related concerns highlighted by both Con-
gress (e.g., “assumption,” “view,” and “stereotype”)137 and the Su-
preme Court (e.g., “stereotyping” (or “stereotype”) and “belief”)138 also 
parallel the congressional terminology and concerns reflected in the 
ADA’s enactment. 
 The critical point, of course, is that these interchangeable terms 
and concerns (among the ADA, the ADEA, and Title VII) evidence an 
underlying central philosophy that is common to all of them—
namely, that employer perception or stereotype is an appropriate jus-
tification for imposing employment discrimination liability, even 
when that perception or stereotype is erroneous and inaccurate. It is 
this common and shared philosophy that warrants common and 
shared protections (such as the “regarded as” protection) across the 
                                                                                                                    
phenomenon of stereotyping individual members of a group because of the characteristics 
(or the perceived characteristics) of the group as a whole” and that “stereotyping is a key 
problem in the employment area because much discrimination stems from employer per-
ceptions about the abilities of various groups (racial, ethnic, or gender) in society”). 
 134. See supra part II.B (discussing the ADA legislative reports that referenced these 
terms and concerns). 
 135. See supra notes 100-04 and accompanying text. 
 136. See supra notes 105-16 and accompanying text. 
 137. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text. 
 138. See supra notes 121-33 and accompanying text. 
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federal employment discrimination law spectrum. Simply put: If each 
of these laws reflects an identical central philosophy of targeting  
an employer’s erroneous perception over an employee’s reality for 
purposes of imposing employment discrimination liability, then  
why should only one of them provide “regarded as” protection as the 
keystone to attacking that employer perception? Comparable percep-
tion-based philosophies should translate to comparable perception-
based protections.
B.   Fully Advancing Federal Employment  
Discrimination Policy and Purpose 
 Beyond being justified from an underlying philosophical stand-
point, an extension of the ADA’s “regarded as” protection to Title VII 
and the ADEA is warranted from a policy perspective. This protec-
tion is necessary to advance fully the crucial antidiscrimination poli-
cies and purposes of these other laws. 
 Beyond sharing certain underlying philosophies, the ADA, Title 
VII, and the ADEA also share equally comprehensive goals and pur-
poses. When enacting the ADA, Congress aimed for the stratosphere. 
It stated that the ADA’s goal and purpose was to create (1) “a clear 
and comprehensive national mandate” against disability-based dis-
crimination and (2) “clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards” 
to battle that discrimination.139
 Congress aimed equally as high when enacting Title VII and the 
ADEA. As to Title VII, Congress expansively sought to “meet a na-
tional need” by (1) “eradicating significant areas of discrimination on 
a nationwide basis”140 and (2) broadly “eliminat[ing] discriminatory 
employment practices by business.”141 When Congress amended Title 
VII almost twenty years ago by passing the Civil Rights Act of 
1991,142 it reiterated that “Congress made clear [by enacting Title 
VII] that it intended to prohibit all invidious consideration of sex, 
race, color, religion, or national origin in employment decisions.”143 In 
fact, akin to its description of the goal and purpose of the ADA, Con-
                                                                                                                    
 139. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)-(2) (2006). 
 140. H.R. REP. NO. 88-914 (1963), as reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2393 
(Comm. on the Judiciary) (legislative report pagination unavailable). 
 141. Id., as reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2391; see also id., as reprinted in 1964 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2401 (stating that “[t]he purpose of [Title VII] is to eliminate . . . dis-
crimination in employment based on race, color, religion, or national origin”). 
 142. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
42 U.S.C.). In part, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 “expanded the remedies available to . . . 
plaintiffs by permitting, for the first time, the recovery of compensatory and punitive dam-
ages.” Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S. 843, 848 (2001); see also 42 
U.S.C. § 1981a(a) (2006) (providing compensatory and punitive damage remedies under 
Title VII, subject to certain conditions and monetary caps). 
 143. H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(II), at 17 (1991), as reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549 
(Comm. on the Judiciary) (emphasis added). 
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gress broadly characterized Title VII as a “mandate that discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, gender, national origin, or religion has no 
place in employment decisions.”144
 As to the ADEA, Congress stated the comparably comprehensive 
goal and purpose of “outlin[ing] a national policy against discrimina-
tion in employment on account of age.”145 Reiterating its aim in the 
“statement of findings and purpose” within the ADEA itself, Con-
gress expansively declared that one of the Act’s purposes was “to 
prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment.”146
 While the ADA, Title VII, and the ADEA each manifest these 
equally broad antidiscrimination policies, the policies of Title VII and 
the ADEA are frustrated and compromised if “regarded as” protec-
tion does not extend to them. The reason is straight-forward: “re-
garded as” protection allows a federal antidiscrimination law to fer-
ret out and capture an otherwise elusive subset of discriminating 
employers. One can best understand the impact of the “regarded as” 
protection by categorizing the entire group of discriminating employ-
ers into two distinct subsets: (1) the “accurate discriminators”: those 
who correctly perceive or determine a person to be within a certain 
protected group or class and then discriminate (due to actual animus 
or otherwise) based on that trait; and (2) the “erroneous discrimina-
tors”: those who incorrectly perceive or determine a person to be 
within a certain protected group or class and then discriminate (due 
to actual animus or otherwise) based on that trait. 
 Initially, it is important to note that employers who fall into either 
subset are identical in discriminatory intent and action. An “accurate 
discriminator” and an “erroneous discriminator” are each motivated 
to act based on a protected trait, and each actually manifests that in-
tent in the form of a tangible, adverse employment action. Of course, 
the difference between these employers is the accuracy of the percep-
tion of protected status—one subset’s employers happened to be 
“right,” while the other subset’s employers happened to be “wrong.” 
But, the “erroneous discriminators” are—to be blunt—still discrimi-
nators. Recognizing this reality, the Perkins court noted that “the de-
sire to engage in unlawful discrimination is [still] present”147 in these 
employers, and the Ninth Circuit in Estate of Amos similarly reite-
                                                                                                                    
 144. H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(I), at 14 (1991), as reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 552 
(Comm. on Education and Labor). 
 145. H.R. REP. NO. 90-805 (1967), as reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2213, 2220 
(Comm. on Education and Labor) (legislative report pagination unavailable).  
 146. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (2006). 
 147. Perkins v. Lake County Dep’t of Utils., 860 F. Supp. 1262, 1277 n.17 (N.D.  
Ohio 1994). 
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rated that “alleged discrimination is no less malevolent because it 
was based upon an erroneous assumption.”148
 Turning to the policy perspective, a federal employment discrimi-
nation law that lacks—or is viewed as lacking—“regarded as” protec-
tion identifies and holds accountable only the first subset of discri-
minating employers (the “accurate discriminators”). The second sub-
set (the “erroneous discriminators”) escapes liability and is in no way 
deterred from discriminating again (and again and again), thereby 
substantially compromising that law’s comprehensive antidiscrimi-
nation policy and purpose. Under this scenario, the employer in Part 
I of this Article (Company XYZ)—which harbored, and acted upon, 
discriminatory intent based on age, pregnancy, lineage and national 
origin, and religion—avoids liability as to Bob, Catherine, Don, and 
Ellen, respectively, and is “free to discriminate another day.” 
 In contrast, a federal employment discrimination law that con-
tains—or is viewed as containing—this “regarded as” protection cap-
tures and holds responsible both subsets of discriminating employ-
ers. The “erroneous discriminators” do not get off scot-free and are 
thus deterred from discriminating again, which fully advances that 
law’s comprehensive antidiscrimination policy and purpose.149 Under 
this scenario, Company XYZ would be liable to Bob, Catherine, Don, 
and Ellen (due to its discriminatory intent and action) and dissuaded 
from discriminating “another day.”  
 Thus, it is important to understand that the impact of the “re-
garded as” protection is much broader than any one particular plain-
tiff, such as Bob, Catherine, Don, or Ellen. While the protection 
would guard the interests of each of these four particular plaintiffs 
whom Company XYZ mistakenly perceived as possessing the respec-
tive protected traits, it goes much further than each of them. This 
                                                                                                                    
 148. Estate of Amos v. City of Page, 257 F.3d 1086, 1094 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Leo-
nard v. Katsinas, No. 05-1069, 2007 WL 1106136, at *9 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 2007) (“[I]f there 
is evidence that an alleged discriminator believed the [employee or job applicant] plaintiffs 
to be a [sic] members of a [protected] class . . . and discriminated against them based on 
this belief, should it even matter if the plaintiffs are actually members of that protected 
class or not? Anti-discrimination statutes . . . were undoubtedly drafted to curb certain ac-
tions grounded in racial animus, and prohibited racial animus should arguably be no less 
actionable if carried out in a case of mistaken identity.”). 
 149. See also Onwuachi-Willig & Barnes, supra note 89, at 1289 (discussing race-based 
discrimination claims under Title VII and stating that “to redress discrimination in the 
workplace, courts must recognize employment discrimination claims where one is, for ex-
ample, ‘regarded as’ black, with all of the socially ascribed negative stereotypes of the 
group”); Ken Nakasu Davison, Comment, The Mixed-Race Experience: Treatment of Racial-
ly Miscategorized Individuals Under Title VII, 12 ASIAN L.J. 161, 165, 186 (2005) (discuss-
ing race-based discrimination claims under Title VII and arguing that an “intent-based 
model”—one that “focuses on the intent of the discriminator, rather than whether the 
[plaintiff] . . . falls into the required immutable category”—would “best carr[y] out Title 
VII’s mandate to prevent the harmful effects of discrimination” and be “superior in carry-
ing out the directive of Title VII to remedy discrimination in the workplace”). 
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“regarded as” protection also guards the interests of the subsequent 
multitudes of prospective plaintiffs whom Company XYZ will accu-
rately perceive as possessing those respective traits. 
 By ferreting out this otherwise overlooked subset of employment 
discriminators, the “regarded as” protection can be fairly characte-
rized as an indispensable tool in achieving the expansive antidiscri-
mination policies and purposes shared by the ADA, Title VII, and the 
ADEA. Indeed, when enacting the ADA, Congress viewed the “re-
garded as” protection as “necessary . . . to achieve the ADA’s stated 
purpose” of creating a “ ‘clear and comprehensive national 
mandate.’ ”150 In other words, Congress considered the “regarded as” 
protection as targeting a piece of the discrimination problem (the 
subset of “erroneous discriminators”) that would otherwise be neglected. 
 So, the begged question is: Given that each of these laws shares 
the same lofty goal of comprehensive employment discrimination 
prohibition, then why should only one of them provide the very “re-
garded as” protection that Congress views as “necessary” to address-
ing a key piece of that discrimination problem? It is not as if Con-
gress aimed for only the ADA to constitute a “comprehensive” antidi-
scrimination mandate and opted to seek a mere “partial” mandate 
via Title VII and the ADEA. And, the “regarded as” protection is no 
less “necessary” outside the ADA context, as that same piece of the 
discrimination problem (the subset of “erroneous discriminators”) 
can—and does—exist under Title VII and the ADEA. Consequently, 
comparable policies against discrimination should translate to com-
parable protections against discrimination.151
 As a concluding but important point, the regrettable (and some-
what ironic) consequence of a failure (or refusal) to extend the “re-
garded as” protection to Title VII and the ADEA is an “inequality” (or 
“disparate treatment”) of the federal antidiscrimination laws and 
their respective policies. Specifically, depending upon whether the 
necessary “regarded as” protection is available to capture the other-
wise elusive subset of “erroneous discriminators,” a federal employ-
ment discrimination law holds one of two positions on the proverbial 
totem pole: (1) A “superior” or “preferred” position, with its antidi-
scrimination policy and purpose being fully advanced, by the target-
ing of these otherwise overlooked “erroneous discriminators;” or (2) 
                                                                                                                    
 150. Leonard, 2007 WL 1106136, at *12 (emphasis added) (quoting 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1201(b)(1)). 
 151. See Onwuachi-Willig & Barnes, supra note 89, at 1332-33 (discussing race-based 
discrimination claims under Title VII and stating that (1) the ADA “does not differ from 
Title VII in its purpose of stamping out employment decisions based purely on the social 
meanings attached to membership in a marginalized group” and (2) thus “it makes sense 
that antidiscrimination law concerning race discrimination, like that concerning disability 
discrimination, should include a means of evaluating claims where a person is ‘regarded as’ 
being black or as belonging to any particular race”). 
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An “inferior” or “non-preferred” position, with its antidiscrimination 
policy and purpose being partially compromised, by allowing these 
“erroneous discriminators” to escape liability.  
 From a policy perspective, those courts which recognize non-ADA 
“regarded as” protection equally elevate all of the federal employ-
ment discrimination laws (including Title VII and the ADEA) to this 
“superior” or “preferred” position. In contrast, jurisdictions that 
refuse to recognize this protection outside the ADA context (1) ele-
vate only the ADA to the “superior” or “preferred” position and (2) re-
legate Title VII and the ADEA to the “inferior” or “non-preferred” po-
sition. Congress intended no such inferior position for these laws and 
their respective antidiscrimination policy and purpose.  
 Finally, one could reasonably argue that “regarded as” protection 
should not extend beyond the ADA because of the absence of this pro-
tection from the express statutory language of Title VII or the ADEA. 
Indeed, certain courts have embraced this view and thus rejected 
non-ADA “regarded as” claims.152 For example, the Lewis court hig-
hlighted Congress’s explicit inclusion of this protection in the ADA 
and then reasoned that “[i]f Congress had wanted to permit a similar 
cause of action under Title VII . . . , it could have so provided.”153 The 
Butler court employed similar reasoning, stating that “Title VII . . . 
says nothing about protection of persons who are perceived to belong 
to a protected class” and observing that “Congress has shown, 
through the . . . [ADA], that it knows how to enact legislation that 
protects persons who are wrongly perceived to be in a protected class.”154
 While this view may seem appealing on the surface, it is flawed 
for three reasons. First, this view overlooks the inherent ambiguity 
in the language of Title VII and the ADEA by focusing only upon 
what each of those laws does not say, rather than considering what 
each actually does say. When looking at the latter, the language of 
these other federal employment discrimination laws can, at best, be 
viewed as “ambiguous as to whether the discrimination is permitted 
when it is based on an employer’s misperception of the employee’s ac-
tual [protected trait or class].”155
 For example, Title VII prohibits employment-based discrimination 
against a person “because of such individual’s race, color, religion, 
                                                                                                                    
 152. See supra Part III.A (discussing applicable precedent). 
 153. Lewis v. N. Gen. Hosp., 502 F. Supp. 2d 390, 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); see supra notes 
35-42 and accompanying text (discussing the Lewis case). 
 154. Butler v. Potter, 345 F. Supp. 2d 844, 850 (E.D. Tenn. 2004) (citation omitted); see
supra notes 43-52 and accompanying text (discussing the Butler case). 
 155. Williams, supra note 85, at 371; see also Leonard, 2007 WL 1106136, at *12 (dis-
cussing the issue of “regarded as” protection under § 1981 and Title VII and stating that 
“[i]t would obviously be preferable if there were a clear statutory mandate on point”). 
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sex, or national origin,”156 while the ADEA prohibits such discrimina-
tion against a person “because of such individual’s age.”157 Yet, as one 
commentator has observed in the Title VII context of religious dis-
crimination, this “because of” language “does not provide clarity” on 
the “regarded as” issue, because “[o]n its face[, the language] does not 
indicate if the prohibition occurs [1] simply because the discrimina-
tion is based on religion or . . . [2] because the discrimination is based 
on the employee’s actual religion.”158 By concentrating only upon the 
“absent” language in Title VII and the ADEA, the Lewis-type or But-
ler-type argument fails to see the “present” language that, due to its 
ambiguity, can accommodate “regarded as” protection. 
 Second, this view flatly ignores the above-referenced central phi-
losophy that is common to the ADA, Title VII, and the ADEA—
namely, that employer perception or stereotype is an appropriate jus-
tification for imposing employment discrimination liability, even 
when that perception or stereotype is erroneous and inaccurate.159 As 
evidenced by the legislative histories of the ADEA and Title VII (in-
                                                                                                                    
 156. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). 
 157. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)-(2) (2006). 
 158. Williams, supra note 85, at 370 (emphasis added) (citation omitted) (noting also 
that “some courts interpret this [‘because of’] phrase to mean that the discrimination simp-
ly must be rooted in a religious bias” while “other courts interpret this phrase to mean that 
the employee must be a member of a protected class or group, which is defined by the  
employee’s actual religious beliefs”); see also Stephen M. Cutler, Note, A Trait-Based  
Approach to National Origin Claims Under Title VII, 94 YALE L.J. 1164, 1164, 1169  
(1985) (discussing national origin-based discrimination claims under Title VII and noting 
that judicial recognition of claims based on “cultural characteristics or traits” is “consistent 
with the language and purpose of Title VII . . . . [b]ecause the basic prohibitory provisions 
of the statute are cast in general terms and do not provide a precise definition of national 
origin discrimination”). 
 Interestingly, however, the ADEA not only includes this general language of “be-
cause of such individual’s age,” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1)-(2), but also expressly specifies that 
its “prohibitions . . . shall be limited to individuals who are at least 40 years of age.” Id. § 
631(a). Thus, one could argue that this additional language is further evidence of Con-
gress’s intent to not extend ADEA-related protection to a person who falls below the age 
threshold despite being “regarded as” at least forty years old. 
 This argument is credible. Yet, on one level, this additional language is still openly 
silent on the “regarded as” concept and could potentially be viewed as comparably ambi-
guous. After all, this language might be interpreted as applying to (i) only the narrow 
group of persons who are, in reality, “at least 40 years of age” or (ii) the broader groups of 
persons who are, in reality or perception by the employer, “at least 40 years of age.” See 29 
U.S.C. § 631(a). While the ADEA’s additional language would definitively exclude from 
protection any individual who was actually, and perceived as being, below forty years old, 
it does not expressly address what happens when reality and perception diverge.  
 On a more persuasive level, however, even if this additional ADEA language renders 
it less ambiguous on the “regarded as” issue, any resulting judicial refusal to recognize “re-
garded as” protection under the ADEA remains problematic because it (1) ignores the 
ADEA’s underlying philosophy of targeting employers who engage in perception-based or 
stereotype-based discrimination and (2) significantly frustrates the ADEA’s national  
antidiscrimination policy. See supra Part IV.A.1 and B (respectively). 
 159. See supra Part IV.A (discussing this underlying philosophy shared by the ADA, 
the ADEA, and Title VII). 
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cluding the PDA), Congress made the philosophical choice to combat 
erroneous and unfounded perceptions or stereotypes that are held by 
employers as to the protected traits of race, color, religion, sex, na-
tional origin, and age.160 The Supreme Court also has made this phi-
losophical choice, as it has opted to place the proverbial target on the 
backs of employers who act based upon such inaccurate perceptions 
or stereotypes as to such protected traits.161
 Unfortunately, the Lewis-type or Butler-type argument never 
digs—even superficially—beyond the language of Title VII or the 
ADEA to uncover and deduce this central philosophy of targeting an 
employer’s erroneous perception over an employee’s reality for pur-
poses of imposing employment discrimination liability. Instead, it 
engages in a statutory language-based “rush to judgment” that, by 
ultimately snubbing non-ADA “regarded as” claims, rejects the philo-
sophical thread that is common across the federal employment dis-
crimination law spectrum. 
 Finally, this view perpetuates federal employment discrimination 
and thus significantly frustrates applicable antidiscrimination policy 
and purpose. As acknowledged by Congress, the “regarded as” protec-
tion is a necessary tool for identifying, and holding accountable, a  
sizeable piece of the discrimination problem—the subset of “errone-
ous discriminators.”162
 Regrettably, the Lewis-type or Butler-type view fails to see the 
“big picture” involving these “erroneous discriminators.” As men-
tioned above, if an “erroneous discriminator” is allowed to escape lia-
bility simply because its perception or stereotype did not “match” an 
employee’s actual or “real” trait or status, the discrimination is not 
going to end there. Instead, that same employer will continue to har-
bor that same discriminatory intent and to engage in the same pat-
tern of discrimination. And, this subsequent discrimination will af-
fect not only the particular individuals who happen to be erroneously 
labeled as having a certain protected trait but also the many others 
who happen to be accurately labeled as having that trait. 
 Thus, the Lewis-type or Butler-type argument ignores two related 
facts: (1) the “erroneous discriminator” does not confine its discrimi-
nation to those who actually lack the perceived protected trait; but 
rather (2) that employer will eventually “get it right” and be correct 
in its perception or stereotype. Stated differently, this view fails to 
see the broad impact of the “regarded as” protection—as guarding 
                                                                                                                    
 160. See supra Parts IV.A.1-2 (discussing, respectively, the legislative histories of the 
ADEA and Title VII, including the PDA). 
 161. See supra Parts IV.A.1-2 (discussing, respectively, the applicable Supreme Court 
precedent under the ADEA and Title VII). 
 162. See supra Part IV.B (discussing the importance of the “regarded as” protection to 
full advancement of federal employment discrimination policy and purpose). 
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not only the interests of one particular plaintiff as to whom an em-
ployer had erroneous perceptions but also the interests of all subse-
quent prospective plaintiffs as to whom that employer will have ac-
curate perceptions. Thus, instead of achieving any “comprehensive” 
prohibition against federal employment discrimination under Title 
VII or the ADEA, this view represents, at best, a “partial” promotion 
of national antidiscrimination policy and purpose.163
V.   CONCLUSION
 This Article has proposed an extension of the “regarded as” pro-
tection under federal employment discrimination law. This uniformi-
ty of employee protection (and employer liability) under the ADA, 
Title VII, and the ADEA is warranted for two reasons. First, these 
other federal employment discrimination laws share with the ADA a 
central congressional and judicial philosophy—the targeting of an 
employer’s erroneous perception over an employee’s reality for pur-
poses of imposing employment discrimination liability. And, second, 
the “regarded as” protection is necessary to capture that otherwise 
elusive subset of “erroneous discriminators” and thus fully advance 
the comprehensive antidiscrimination policies and purposes of these 
other laws. 
 Simply put, is an employer any less a “discriminator” when it acts 
based on a perception or stereotype regarding a person possessing a 
certain protected trait under Title VII or the ADEA that happens to 
be “wrong” rather than “right”? The discriminatory intent is the 
same. The discriminatory action is the same. The harms and losses 
to the victim of the discrimination are the same. An extension of the 
“regarded as” protection across the federal employment discrimina-
                                                                                                                    
 163. This Article has argued that the “regarded as” protection should apply to those 
traits or classes that are protected under Title VII (e.g., race, color, religion, sex, and na-
tional origin) and the ADEA (e.g., forty years old or older), so that an employer would be li-
able for engaging in erroneous perception-based or stereotype-based discrimination. 
 Interestingly, however, the ADA, Title VII, and the ADEA not only protect traits or 
classes but also certain employee activities in response to purportedly unlawful employer 
conduct. Specifically, each of these laws contains an antiretaliation provision, which gen-
erally prohibits an employer from retaliating against an individual for having “opposed 
any act or practice made unlawful” by that law or having “made a charge, testified, as-
sisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing” under 
that law. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (containing the ADEA’s antiretaliation provision); 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006) (containing Title VII’s antiretaliation provision); 42 U.S.C. § 
12203(a) (2006) (containing the ADA’s antiretaliation provision). 
 Thus, the similar question arises: Should an employer be subject to liability for retal-
iation if it erroneously believes that an employee has engaged in such protected activities 
and then retaliates against him or her on that basis? While beyond the scope of this Ar-
ticle, one could credibly argue that the reasons and justifications which support an  
extension of the “regarded as” protection to the traits or classes enumerated in Title  
VII and the ADEA also warrant its extension to the activities specified in these antiretalia-
tion provisions. 
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tion spectrum will bring needed uniformity of employee protection 
and treat the “erroneous discriminators” as harshly as any other dis-
criminating employer. 
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